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TWENTY YEARS OF LABOUR LAW
AND THE CHARTER©
BY DIANNE POTHIER'

This article critically reviews the Charter
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada relating
to labour law. The rejection of the right to strike and to
bargain collectively as part of freedom of association
reflect substantial judicial deference to legislative policy
choices. Recently, however, a constitutional right of
unfair labour protection for particularly vulnerable
workers shows some judicial willingness to intervene.
While freedom of expression provides significant scope
to union supporters, picketing and leafleting are still
subject to wide restraint, the exact parameters of which
remain unclear. The Charter has had only a modest
effect on labour law. Even successful challenges have
produced results well within the dominant legislative
model in Canada.

Cet article offre une r6vision critique de la
jurisprudence issue de la Cour supr6me du Canada en
matinre du droit du travail et de la Charte. Le fait de ne
pas recconnaitre le droit de faire [a gr ve et Ia garantie
du droit de n6gocier collectivement comme faisant
partie int6grale de la libert6 d'association d6montre ]a
retenue donn6e aux choix politiques 16gislatifs.
R6cemment, un droit constitutionnel prot6geant les
ouvriers paticulirement vuln6rables a d6montr6 une
volont6 judiciaire d'intervenir en mati~re de pratiques
d6loyales. Les piquets de grave et la distribution de
tracts demeurent restreints par des paramtres flous,
malgr6 que ]a libert6 d'expression pr6voit une port~e
consid6rable pour les partisans des syndicats. La Charte
n'a eu qu'un impact modeste sur le droit du travail.
M~me les contestations couronn~es de succs ont
produit des r6sultats qui s'ins rent au niveau du module
l6gislatif dominant canadiqn.
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INTRODUCTION

Robert Fulford, one of the early critics of the CanadianCharterof
Rights and Freedoms,' used labour issues as a prime example of the illadvisedness of an entrenched Charter,predicting that "the result may be
chaos," 2 and that "the Charteris now threatening the future of the labour
movement." 3 In contrast, one of the early Charter proponents, New
Democratic Party (NDP) Member of Parliament Svend Robinson, cited a
legacy of blatantly anti-union legislation as part of the historical
justification for why an entrenched Charterwas necessary to protect rights.4
After twenty years of litigation of labour issues under the Charter,neither
Fulford's fears nor Robinson's hopes have been realized. After nineteen
years, it would have been apt to say that the Charterhad only a marginal
effect on labour law in Canada. Three major Supreme Court of Canada
decisions5 in the past year have created the potential for a more significant
impact, but it is still too early to know the full implications of these recent
decisions.
This article will review the scope of Charterguarantees, particularly
of freedom of association and expression, in the labour context. The first
part of this article will analyze the relevance of the Charter, especially
section 2(d), freedom of association, to union organization rights. The
following parts will consider the significance of section 2(b), freedom of
expression, for unions and employers, and the impact of the Charter on
union security provisions.
II.

THE CHARTER AND UNION ORGANIZATION

During the process leading up to the adoption of the Charter,
labour issues were not pre-eminent in the debate. In the proceedings of the
Special Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee (Hays-Joyal
Committee) considering the draft constitutional resolution, Progressive

1Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [Charter).
2 Robert Fulford, "Charter of Wrongs" 101:12 (December 1986) Saturday Night 7 at 8.
Ibid.

4 Svend Robinson, "The NDP, the Charter and the Constitution" Canadian Forum (June-July
1981) 14 at 14.
5 R. v. Advance Cutting& CoringLtd. et al., 2001 SCC 70 [Advance Cutting]; Dunmore v. Ontario
(A. G.), 2001 SCC 94 [Dunmore]; and Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale and
DepartmentStore Union, Local 558, 2002 SCC 8 [Pepsi].
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Conservative Member of Parliament Jim Hawkes observed the following:

"[w]e have sat over 90 presentations. Conspicuous in those presentations
has been the lack of representation from what I would call the world of
work."6
The list of witnesses appearing before the Special Joint Committee

did not include any union representatives.7 However, there was one
proposed amendment to the resolution that was of special interest to
unions. Robinson proposed that section 2(d)of the Charterbe amended
from simply "freedom of association" to "freedom of association including
the freedom to organize and bargain collectively." 8 The proposed

amendment was defeated in the Special Joint Committee by a vote of
twenty to two, 9 with only the NDP Members of Parliament (Svend Robinson

and Lorne Nystrom) voting in favour. The official Liberal government
explanation for opposing the amendment was provided by Acting Minister
of Justice, Robert Kaplan:
Our position on the suggestion that there be specific reference to freedom to organize and
bargain collectively is that it is already covered in the freedom of association already in ...
the Charter and that by singling out association for bargaining one might tend to diminish
all other forms of association which are contemplated-church associations, associations
of fraternal organizations or community organizations.'

However, things have not worked out that way-collective bargaining has
not been held to be included in freedom of association.

There have been seven Supreme Court of Canada decisions dealing
with the impact of the Charteron the rights of labour organization. In 1987
a trilogy of cases dealt with the question of whether section 2(d) included
the rights to strike and/or bargain collectively; union arguments to this
effect were ultimately unsuccessful. The lead case was Reference Re Public
Service Employee RelationsAct (Alberta);"'the companion cases were Public
2 and Retail, Wholesale
Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada,"
and

6 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution
of Canada, No. 33 (9 January 1981) at 90.
Ibid. No. 57 (9 January 1981) at 54-89. Written submissions were received from the Canadian
Labour Congress, the British Columbia Federation of Labour, the British Columbia Provincial Council
of Carpenters, and the Christian Labour Association of Canada.
8 Ibid. No. 43 (22 January 1981) at 69.
9 Ibid. at 79.
10 Ibid. at 69-70.
11[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 [Alberta Reference].
12 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 [PSAC].
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DepartmentStore Union v. Saskatchewan.13 Three years later, the results of
the trilogy were reinforced in ProfessionalInstitute of the Public Service of
Canada v. Northwest Territories(Commissioner),4 so much so that a 1994
challenge of back-to-work legislation based on section 7 was deemed to
warrant only a two-paragraph oral judgment applying the section 2(d)
reasoning to section 7 5 In the two most recent cases, Delisle v. Canada
(DeputyAttorney General), 6 and Dunmore,17 the premise that section 2(d)
does not include the right to collective bargaining was taken as a given.
Instead, the focus was on the application of section 2(d) to unfair labour
practice protection.
What is especially noteworthy about these cases is that all seven
involved claims where the union was simply trying to plug into the general
framework of collective bargaining legislation in Canada. The cases all
dealt with situations where, for various reasons, the union could not invoke
the generally applicable labour law regime; only in Dunmore did the union
have even limited success challenging the exclusion of agricultural workers.
What requires emphasis is that none of the seven cases sought to challenge
the basic framework of Canadian collective bargaining law; rather they
sought to join it. The significance of this point is that the general statutory
rights to strike and bargain collectively that were targeted for constitutional
recognition are very circumscribed rights. Yet even these circumscribed
rights remain dependent on statutory recognition, without constitutional
underpinning.
The constitutional litigation about union organization rights is a
powerful affirmation of the comments made by Professors Judy Fudge and
Harry Glasbeek:
The practical politics of these worker efforts is not to question the values and assumptions
of the PC 1003 model, but rather to change its coverage and reach. This confers a status on
this collective bargaining model which it ought not to have; it treats the regime as the
optimal product of the evolution of capital-labour regulation, rather than just a valuable
compromise which labour squeezed out of capital at a propitious time. PC 1003 was a
compromise. It did not abandon the fundamental tenets of the pre-existing capital-labour
entente which had served to keep labour at a disadvantage."

13 [19871 I S.C.R. 460 [Saskatchewan Dairy
Workers].
[19901 2 S.C.R. 367 [PIPs].
15

lhternational Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union - CanadaArea
Local 500 v. Canada,

[1994] 1 S.C.R. 150.
16 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 [Delisle].
17 Dunmore, supra note

5.
18 Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, "The Legacy of PC 1003" (1995) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 357 at 399.
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In broad terms, the 1944 compromise embodied in Order-inCouncil PC 1003,19 borrowing from the 1935 American WagnerAct,20 and
implemented both federally and provincially after World War II as the
general framework of Canadian labour relations law, is as follows: the
concessions to unions are that union members are granted unfair labour
practice protection (protection against retaliation for engaging in union
activities), and a union that can demonstrate majority support in a
bargaining unit is entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent
of all employees in that unit. Exclusive bargaining agent status compels the
employer to bargain with the union, with the strike weapon as the union's
ultimate bargaining chip. The quid pro quo limitations of the PC 1003
model, however, are that the strike weapon is precluded for union
recognition and during the currency of a collective agreement. The
certification process displaces recognition strikes, and for the most part
certification is for a unit (and often multiple units) of a single employer,
resulting in a very splintered bargaining unit configuration. Grievance
arbitration displaces strikes during the collective agreement, despite the
fact that matters not covered in the collective agreement are not amenable
to grievance arbitration.21 These conditions significantly constrain the
collective economic clout that can lawfully be exercised by workers.
Charterlitigation by unions has not come remotely close to a radical
critique of this predominant model. Instead, Charter litigation has been
mostly unsuccessful in its attempt to extend the dominant model. The
changes, both gains and losses, in the organization rights of labour over the
last twenty years have been legislative rather than constitutional, and have
been within the framework of the PC 1003 model.22
A.

Strikes

The tenor of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to freedom
of association was set in the 1987 trilogy.23Alberta Reference concerned the
validity of Alberta statutes that precluded strikes by firefighters, police,
hospital workers, and provincial civil servants. Compulsory arbitration was

19 Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, P.C. 1944-1003, [PC 1003].
20 NationalLabor RelationsAct 29 U.S.C. §372 (1935).
21 See Brian A. Langille, "Equal Partnership in Canadian Labour Law" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 496 and Paul C. Weiler, "The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions" (1969) 19
U.T.L.J. 16.
22 Fudge & Glasbeek, supra note 18.
23 See supra notes 11 to 13.
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substituted for strikes, but under significant constraints. PSAC involved

federal legislation that extended the life of public sector collective
agreements by two years, thereby postponing the right to strike, and
imposing wage increases limited to 6 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively,

in each of the two years.2 4 Saskatchewan Dairy Workers involved ad hoc

back-to-work legislation, and compulsory arbitration in response to a
general lockout and partial strikes in the dairy industry.
The majority in Alberta Reference used both conceptual and
institutional arguments in concluding that freedom of association does not
include the right to strike. The institutional argument was that the courts
are ill-suited to the determination of the substantive content of labour
law-the complex balancing properly characterized as a legislative
determination. I have always been ambivalent about the results of the
1987 trilogy. While, as I am about to explain, I find the majority's
conceptual analysis fundamentally flawed, that conceptual weakness itself
reinforces the institutional arguments. 6 I contend that the Court's
conceptual arguments display a fundamental misunderstanding of basic
labour law principles, such that entrusting the judges to develop labour law
principles in accordance with the Charter would be a very dangerous
exercise.
As a reason for concluding that the right to strike and the right to
bargain collectively are not fundamental rights included in section 2(d),
Justice Le Dain, speaking for half of the Court inAlberta Reference, relied
on the fact that the rights claimed were the modern creation of statute.27
Why a recent creation of statute cannot be a fundamental right is not really
explained by the majority. 28 By this theory, the equality rights guaranteed
by section 15 of the Charter are inapt, since it took the introduction of
human rights legislation for Canadian law to accept that non-discrimination
rights could trump freedom of contract.2 ' The fact that World War II was
24 Given inflation rates at the time, those wage increases were considered harsh.
25 Supra note I I at 391-92, Le Dain J. (Beetz and La Forest JJ., concurring), and at 414-20,
McIntyre J.
26 It should be noted that Chief Justice Laskin, the most noted labour law expert to sit on the
Supreme Court of Canada, died before any Charter labour cases were heard by the Supreme Court of
Canada. From the late Chief Justice's death in 1984 until the appointment of Justice LeBel in 2000,
none of the Supreme Court of Canada judges had a labour specialty prior to judicial office.
27
Supra note 11 at 391. See also the comments made by Justice McIntyre, supra note 11 at 413.
28 This argument was specifically rejected by Chief Justice Dickson, dissenting (Wilson J.,
concurring), ibid. at 360.
29 Walter S. Tarnopolsky, "The Iron Hand in the Velvet Gl6ve: Administration and Enforcement
of Human Rights Legislation in Canada" (1968) 46 Can. Bar Rev. 565.
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being fought against the racism of Nazi Germany did not preclude the
Supreme Court of Canada, at the start of that war, from refusing to make
a claim against discrimination cognizable in Canadian law.3"
One element that all members of the Court recognized as part of
freedom of association is what Chief Justice Dickson labelled as the
constitutive approach, 3' namely, the right to establish, belong to, maintain,
and participate in an association's lawful activities.32 If freedom of
association did not include at least that, it would have absolutely no content
at all. Nonetheless, the majority inAlberta Reference somehow missed the
point that one element of the challenged Alberta legislation did run afoul
of this principle in expressly forbidding police officers from belonging to
unions.33 However, more recently, in Delisle, all members of the Court
recognized that precluding police officers (in this case, the RCMP) from
belonging to a union is a breach of section 2(d). Still, the majority
concluded that the exclusion of the RCMP from the
Public Service Staff
3
RelationsAct 34 did not have that purpose or effect. 1
In Alberta Reference, the Court was also in agreement with what
Chief Justice Dickson labelled the derivative approach: that freedom of
association covers the right to the collective exercise of rights
constitutionally protected for individuals. 36 For Justice Le Dain, speaking
also for Justices La Forest and Beetz, the constitutive and derivative
approaches were as far as they were prepared to go in defining the scope
of freedom of association, a conclusion to which Chief Justice Dickson,
with Justice Wilson concurring, gave short shrift:
What is to be learnt from the United States jurisprudence is not that freedom of association
must be restricted to associational activities involving independent constitutional rights, but
rather, that the express conferral of a freedom of association is unnecessary if all that is

30 Christiev. York, [19401 S.C.R. 139.
31 Alberta Reference, supra note II at
335.
32 Support for the proposition that freedom of association encompasses at least the constitutive
definition was expressed by Chief Justice Dickson, ibid. at 363, Justice Le Dain, ibid. at 391, and
Justice McIntyre, ibid. at 407. For Justice McIntyre, this constitutive definition is the first of his six
propositions as possible approaches to freedom of association.
33
Police Officers Collective BargainingAct, S.A. 1983, c. P-12.05,s. 2(1). Section 2(1 )(a) gave
the
right to belong to and participate only in a police association. Only Chief Justice Dickson's dissent
identified this as a section 2(d) breach ibid. at 362.

34 R.S.C., 1985, c.P-35.
35

Delisle, supra note 16.
36 Supra note 11 at 391, Le Dain J.; ibid. at 407, McIntyre J.; and ibid. at 364, Dickson C.J.C.

376
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intended is to give effect to the collective enjoyment of other individual freedoms.1

In accepting a third proposition as a proper application of freedom
of association, Justice McIntyre agreed with that aspect of the Chief
Justice's decision, specifically, the collective exercise of activities lawful for
the individual.3 8 Yet the half of the Court that agreed that this was a proper
basis for analyzing freedom of association also agreed it could not support
a constitutionally protected right to strike:
When this definition of freedom of association is applied, it is clear that it does not
guarantee the right to strike. Since the right to strike is not independently protected under
the Charter, it can receive protection under freedom of association only if it is an activity
which is permitted by law to an individual. ... Modern labour relations legislation has so
radically altered the legal relationship between employees and employers in unionized
industries that no analogy may be drawn between the lawful actions of individual employees
in ceasing to work and the lawful actions of union members in engaging in a strike. ... It is
apparent, in my view, that interpreting freedom of association to mean that every individual
is free to do with others that which he is lawfully entitled to do alone would not entail
guaranteeing the right to strike. I am supported in this conclusion by the Chief Justice, who
states at p. 367 in his judgment, "There is no individual equivalent to a strike. The refusal
to work by one individual does not parallel a collective refusal to work. The latter is
qualitatively rather than quantitatively different."-"

In a critique of this decision, David Beatty and Steven Kennett
challenged the conclusion that a strike is qualitatively different,4" but
implicitly accepted the judges' contention that if it were qualitatively
different, that would bring it outside Justice McIntyre's third proposition.
I do not agree that the qualitative/quantitative distinction is a
sensible one in this context. In my assessment, to accept it undermines the
real point of Justice McIntyre's third proposition in drawing a parallel
between individual and collective activities. In large measure, it is precisely
because collective action is qualitatively different from individual activity
that people choose to engage in collective action; it is often the collective
exercise which turns ineffective action into effective action. Take as an
example a collective exercise of freedom of expression, which all agree is
protected by freedom of association. The comparison between a single
person and ten thousand people demonstrating on Parliament Hill is not
just a quantitative difference. The power of numbers, which explains why

37 Ibid. at 364.
38 Ibid. at 408.
39 Ibid. at 409-12, McIntyre J. [emphasis in original].
40 David Beatty & Steven Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and Political
Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 573 at 589.
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people engage in collective action, also makes the whole more than the sum
of its parts. Few people would be interested in being the lone demonstrator,
but group demonstrations have a dynamic of interaction that prompts
people committed to a cause to join in. It is this qualitative difference that
is the essence of associational activity. Therefore, to say that activities
lawful for the individual are constitutionally protected for the group only
in cases of quantitative, but not qualitative difference, undercuts the point
of drawing an analogy between individual and group activity. If
associational activity is to be genuinely valued through constitutional
protection, the quest should be for broad analogies rather than rigid
comparisons between individual and collective activity.
It is from this perspective that I approach the question of whether
or not the right to strike can be seen as constitutionally protected as the
collective exercise of something lawful for individuals. Justice McIntyre
rejected the argument that there was a right to strike based on an individual
right to refuse to work on two bases: "First, it is not correct to say that it is
lawful for an individual employee to cease work during the currency of his
contract of employment."4 Since the right to strike generally applicable in
Canadian law is all that was being claimed, and this right to strike arises
only prior to the first or after the expiration of any subsequent collective
agreement, it is hard to identify where the analogy between the individual
and the collective breaks down. Justice McIntyre continued:
The second reason is simply that there is no analogy whatever between the cessation of
work by a single employee and a strike conducted in accordance with modern labour
legislation. The individual has, by reason of the cessation of work, either breached or
terminated his contract of employment. It is true that the law will not compel the specific
performance of the contract by ordering him back to work as this would reduce "the
employee to a state tantamount to slavery" (I. Christie, Employment Law in Canada (1980),
p. 268). But, this is markedly different from a lawful strike. An employee who ceases work
does not contemplate a return to work, while employees on strike always contemplate a return
to work. In recognition of this fact, the law does not regard a strike as either a breach of
contract or a termination of employment. Every province and the federal Parliament has
enacted legislation which preserves the employer-employee relationship during a strike....4'

It is Justice McIntyre's sharp distinction between an individual quit
and a collective strike that I consider insensitive to the real dynamics of the
world of work. While it is generally true that individuals who quit their jobs
do not contemplate a return to work, that does not make it impossible to
use quitting as a bargaining tactic to attain better terms and conditions that
would prompt a return to work. The fact that this rarely happens is not
41 Alberta Reference, supra note II
at 410.
42 Ibid. [emphasis added].
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because it is conceptually incoherent, but because most individuals realize
that they do not have enough bargaining clout to make this an effective
tactic. If we individually quit our jobs in an effort to gain better terms, the
odds are very high that the employer will simply accept the resignation. So,
as an individual action, quitting is a very risky move if one does not really
want to leave. What makes a strike more common, and qualitatively
different, is that a collective withdrawal of services puts a lot more
economic pressure on the employer, making it a lot more difficult to resist
the contract demands. Furthermore, while it is generally true that strikers
contemplate a return to work, it is not inevitably true that it will happen.
Although the mere act of striking does not terminate job status under
current labour statutes-something not necessarily part of a constitutional
right to strike-a strike may be lost to such an extent that jobs disappear,
either because the employer goes out of business or downsizes. Less
drastically, a striker disillusioned by a strike's ineffectiveness may take a
permanent job elsewhere. These are exceptional circumstances, just as an
individual who quits in furtherance of contract demands is exceptional.
Strikers normally contemplate a return to work precisely because they think
their collective bargaining power will preserve their jobs. Thus, the real
difference between an individual quit and a collective strike as a bargaining
tactic is that someone engaged in the latter has a much greater chance of
succeeding, and a much lesser chance of ending up jobless. Is this
difference not precisely the point of protecting freedom of association,
namely to enable people to be more effective by acting together?
The ultimate connection between individual quits and a collective
strike has been illustrated in contexts where a collective mass resignation
has been used as a bargaining tactic in cases where strikes were prohibited
by law. For example, in 1973, Nova Scotia nurses working in governmentrun hospitals, without a statutory right to strike, submitted resignations en
masse, a tactic that ultimately produced concessions in a contract owing to
the reality that the large numbers of nurses could not, as a practical matter,
be replaced. Although resignation was a risky move for individual nurses,
the illegal strike tactic was fruitful because of the effective collective
bargaining power it gave the nurses.43 In 2001, by which time most nurses

in Nova Scotia had acquired a statutory right to strike (that the provincial
government then took steps to remove), a mass resignation was again
contemplated as a tactic, but was averted by an agreement with the

Sarah McGinnis, "Nurses may turn to past strike tactics: Resignation
of 700 nurses in 1973
crippled hospitals" The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald(27 June 2001) A3.
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government on final offer selection arbitration." The withdrawal of services
can be a bargaining tactic in whatever form it takes, but it is only likely to

be an effective tactic when undertaken as a collective action. Therefore, the
prohibition of a collective withdrawal of services through a strike should be
considered an interference with freedom of association, as an application
of the principle that freedom of association protects the collective exercise
of activities lawful for an individual.

Although inAlberta Reference, Chief Justice Dickson did not accept
a constitutional right to strike based on this principle, he ultimately did
endorse a constitutional right to strike as something that had no individual
counterpart. In his dissent, he sought to take freedom of association beyond

Justice McIntyre's first three propositions: "If freedom of association only
protects the joining together of persons for common purposes, but not the
pursuit of the very activities for which the association was formed, then the
freedom is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid."45
The Chief Justice spoke eloquently of the significance of collective
bargaining, and ultimate resort to strikes if necessary, in giving working

people some element of control over working conditions given the relative
economic vulnerability of most workers compared to that of their
employers. He concluded that collective bargaining and striking were

essential to the attainment of the objects of unions, and therefore, merited
constitutional protection under section 2(d).4 6 Yet, he never clearly

articulated what it was about the objects of unions that would determine
what kinds of objects of other associations would merit constitutional
protection.47 It was this uncertainty that led the majority of the Court in the

44Amy Smith & Susan LeBlanc, "Back from the brink: Health workers, province
agree to
arbitration to avoid strikes" The [Halifax] Chronicle-Herald(6 July2001) Al.
45 Supra note 11 at 362-63.
46 Ibid. at 371. Nonetheless, what the Chief Justice gave with one hand, in assessing aprimafacie
breach of section 2(d), he largely took back with the other by adopting a very deferential approach
under section 1;PSAC, supra note 12 at 442. He also said that inflation as a section 1 objective did not
have to rise to what was necessary to invoke the emergency doctrine of peace, order and, good
government. (PSAC, ibid. at 440). Since the standard for POGG emergency from Re Anti-InflationAct,
[19761 2 S.C.R. 373 is itself extremely deferential, that underscores the extent to which the Chief
Justice ultimately shared his colleagues' concern that the courts were ill-equipped to determine labour
policy.
In all three cases in the trilogy, Chief Justice Dickson concluded that the right to strike could be
substituted with compulsory arbitration in a broad range of circumstances. Although Justice Wilson
concurred with Chief Justice Dickson in Alberta Reference, she adopted a less deferential stance on
section 1 in PSAC and in Saskatchewan Dairy Workers, supra note 13.
47 In PIPS, supra note 14 at 392-93, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 made the following comment:
Section 2(d) was never meant, in my opinion, to protect this broad range of activity. Though
the pursuit of them may be lawful, the objects of some associations may be either sexist or

380
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Alberta Reference to reject the notion that the objects of an association were
protected under freedom of association, and to conclude that the right to
strike was, therefore, not protected.48 Constitutional protection of the

objects of an association was considered unwarranted since there is no
49
generalized protection for the objects of individuals.
In Pips, in an often quoted passage, Justice Sopinka encapsulated
the approach of the majority in Alberta Reference:
Upon considering the various judgments in the Alberta Reference, I have come to the view
that four separate propositions concerning the coverage of the section 2(d) guarantee of
freedom of association emerge from the case: first, that section 2(d) protects the freedom
to establish, belong to and maintain an association; second, that section 2(d) does not
protect an activity solely on the ground that the activity is a foundational or essential
purpose of an association; third, that section 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the
constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals; and fourth,
that section 2(d) protects the
0"
exercise in association of the lawful rights of individuals.

It is possible, however, to find a constitutionally protected right to

strike without a generalized right for associations to pursue their
fundamental objects. In his dissent, Chief Justice Dickson articulated that
notion in Alberta Reference:
All three enactments prohibit strikes and, as earlier stated, define a strike as a cessation of
work or refusal to work by two or more persons acting in combination or in concert or in
accordance with a common understanding. What is precluded is a collective refusal to work
at the conclusion of a collective agreement. There can be no doubt that the legislation is
aimed at foreclosing a particular collective activity because of its associational nature. The
very nature of a strike, and its raison d'etre, is to influence an employer by joint action
which would be ineffective if it were carried out by an individual."

This theme was picked up fourteen years later by the majority in
Dunmore. Speaking for all but Justice Major, dissenting, and Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6, concurring, Justice Bastarache (after reviewing Justice
Sopinka's summary in PIPS) said the following:

racist or in some other fashion contemptible. To my mind it is difficult to suggest that the
freedom envisaged by section 2(d) was ever meant to embrace these objects. The practical
implications of such an approach militate strongly against its adoption.
48
Alberta Reference, supra note II at 390-91, Le
Dain J.
Ibid. at 404, McIntyre
J.
PIPS, supra note 14 at 401-02. Justice La Forest recorded the following
qualification at 390-9 1:
"I find it unnecessary, however, to say anything about whether the right of association must include
the freedom of persons to join together in pursuit of objects they could lawfully pursue as individuals."
51 Alberta Reference, supra note 11
at 371.
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As these dicta illustrate, the purpose of section 2(d) commands a single inquiry: has the
state precluded activity because of its associational nature, thereby discouraging the
collective pursuit of common goals? In my view, while the four-part test for freedom of
association sheds light on this concept, it does not capture the full range of activities
protected by section 2(d). In particular, there will be occasions where a given activity does
not fall within the third and fourth rules set forth by Sopinka J., in PIPSC,supra, but where
the state has nevertheless prohibited that activity solely because of its associational nature.
These occasions will involve activities which 1) are not protected under any other
constitutional freedom, and 2) cannot, for one reason or another, be understood as the
lawful activities of individuals. As discussed by Dickson C.J., in theAlberta Reference, supra,
such activities may be collective in nature, in that they cannot be performed by individuals
acting alone. The prohibition of such activities must surely, in some cases, be a violation of
s. 2(d).... [T]he collective is "qualitatively" distinct from the individual: individuals associate
not simply because there is strength
in numbers, but because communities can embody
2
objectives that individuals cannot.1

While Justice Bastarache, speaking for the majority in Dunmore,
was thereby adopting the analysis of Chief Justice Dickson's dissent in
Alberta Reference, he nonetheless endorsed the conclusions reached by the
majority inAlberta Reference and PIPS, namely that freedom of association
does not include the right to strike or the right to bargain collectively. The
conclusion that the rights to strike and to collective bargaining are not
included in freedom of association was based on prior Court rulings,53 but
there was no principled defence of this position in Dunmore.
B.

Collective Bargaining

On what basis had previous Court rulings held against collective
bargaining as part of freedom of association? In his dissent in Alberta
Reference, Chief Justice Dickson considered the rights to strike and to
bargain collectively together; it would be rather illogical to conclude that
a right to strike is protected while a right to bargain collectively is not. But,
the reverse is not necessarily true; it would be quite possible to reject a right
to strike, as covered in freedom of association, while endorsing collective
bargaining as covered. Although in Alberta Reference Justice Le Dain
purported to agree with Justice McIntyre in concluding that neither the
right to strike nor the right to bargain collectively are covered under
freedom of association,54 in PSAC Justice McIntyre said otherwise: "My

52 Dunmore, supra note 5 at para. 16 [emphasis in original]. Justice Bastarache's
pre-judicial
experience with minority language education issues (see Arsenault-Camneron v. Prince Edward Island,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 851) perhaps explains his greater appreciation of collective rights compared to the
majority in Alberta Reference.
53 Ibid.
54

Alberta Reference, supra note 11 at 390.
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finding in that case does not, however, preclude the possibility that other
aspects of collective bargaining may receive Charterprotection under the
guarantee of freedom of association." 5
In a book heavily relied on by Justice McIntyre inAlberta Reference,
issues surrounding the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining
were considered distinct enough to warrant separate essays. 6 Justice
McIntyre also relied on the fact that strike issues were considered separate
from collective bargaining issues in the proceedings of the Special Joint
Senate-House of Commons Committee considering the draft Charter." In
Dunmore, Justice Bastarache relied on those proceedings in support of the
proposition that the right of labour organization is included in freedom of

association58 without mentioning that in the same sentence quoted from the
acting Minister of Justice, Robert Kaplan, had also expressed the view that
collective bargaining is also included in freedom of association. 9 Although
it is clear from the BC Motor Vehicle Reference 0 that views expressed in the
Joint Committee are not binding on the courts, they are clearly admissible
evidence. One might have expected the Supreme Court of Canada to have
at least referred to the Committee's view that collective bargaining is
covered in freedom of association, if only to explain why they were wrong.

However, this has not occurred.
Only Justice Sopinka's decision in PIPs contained a clear

articulation of an argument specifically directed at why collective
bargaining is not covered in freedom of association:
The above propositions concerning s. 2(d) of the Charter lead to the conclusion, in my
opinion, that collective bargaining is not an activity that is, without more, protected by the
guarantee of freedom of association. Restrictions on the activity of collective bargaining do
not normally affect the ability of individuals to form or join unions. Although collective
bargaining may be the essential purpose of the formation of trade unions, the argument is
no longer open that this alone is a sufficient condition to engage s. 2(d). Finally, bargaining
for working conditions is not, of itself, a constitutional freedom of individuals, and it is not
an individual legal right in circumstances in which a collective bargaining regime has been

55 PSAC,
supra note 12 at 453.
56 Joseph M. Weiler, "The Regulation of Strikes and Picketing Under the Charter"; Paul
Cavalluzzo, "Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain Collectively" both in Joseph M. Weiler
& Robin M. Elliot, eds., Litigatingthe Valuesofa Nation: The Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986).
57
Alberta Reference, supra note 11 at 412-13.
58 Dunmore, supra note 5.
59 See text accompanying note
10.
60 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [BC Motor Vehicle
Reference].
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implemented."'

It is the last point of the above noted passage that is the most
questionable. In rejecting the application of Justice McIntyre's third
proposition to collective bargaining, it was rather strange for Justice
Sopinka to rely on the displacement of individual negotiation by collective
bargaining where collective bargaining has been recognized by statute.
Since individual bargaining is a lawful right where collective bargaining is
not recognized, it should follow that non-recognition of the right of
collective bargaining in particular circumstances is indeed a rejection of the
right to do collectively what is lawful to be done individually. Justice
Sopinka's analysis has the perverse effect of declaring that because
collective bargaining is sometimes recognized by statute, it cannot have
constitutional recognition in the contexts in which it is withheld. Even
though the analogy between individual and collective bargaining is quite
clear, collective rights are thwarted.
The issue in Pips was the attempt by PIPS to retain its bargaining
status after the employees that it represented moved from being nurses
employed by the federal government to being nurses employed by the
government of the Northwest Territories, while continuing to perform the
same jobs. The official barrier preventing PIPs from continuing on as the
bargaining agent for the nurses was territorial legislation that required
incorporation under statute to be a bargaining agent. PIPS was not so
incorporated; only the Northwest Territories Public Service Association
(NWTPSA) was. The majority in PIPS thought the Alberta Reference to be
dispositive of the case. According to Justice Sopinka:
Ultimately, the appellant's arguments on the failure of this legislation to provide for
certification as of right founder on the fact that since the activity of bargaining is not itself
constitutionally protected, neither is a legislative choice of the bargainer. ... Given that a
government has no common law obligation to bargain at all and can suspend a statutory
obligation to bargain altogether, as the federal government did in PSAC, it would be
inconsistent now to hold that associational rights are created when a government grants
employees the right to bargain but reserves to itself the power to choose the form of the
employees' representative; that is to say, if a government does not have to bargain with
anyone, there can be no constitutional impediment to its choosing to bargain with
62
someone.

It might have been thought that, even if there is no constitutional
right to collective bargaining, if government chooses to bargain with its
employees, the organization must have some claim to be representative of
61

PIPS, supra note 14 at 404 [emphasis in original].

62 Ibid. at 406.
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those employees. This was an argument Justice Cory made in dissent in
PIPS.63 The difficulty with this argument in PIPS was a factual one. On the
face of the legislation, it looked like the government was arbitrarily
designating a bargaining agent. But in reality, PIPS would have had a very
hard time challenging the actual representativeness of the NWTPSA. PIPS
was not claiming that it, rather than the NWTPSA, had the support of the
majority of all the Northwest Territories government employees. Rather
PIPs was trying to carve out a separate bargaining unit for the nurses that
it had previously represented. It is particularly difficult to construct an
argument that the Charterguarantees particular bargaining unit structures,
which presumably explains why PIPS directed its argument to the absence
of a certification process in the Northwest Territories legislation. However,
in doing so, the real issue was obscured. Accordingly, PIPS was not a very
good case for determining the issue of whether there is a right to collective
bargaining encompassed within freedom of association. Still, PIPS is a
fundamental foundation for the premise in Dunmore that collective
bargaining has no constitutional protection.
C.

New Directions?

The issue in Dunmore was the exclusion of agricultural workers
from the coverage of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995.64 The easy

answer, and perhaps the expected one in light of earlier decisions, was the
one given by Justice Major, dissenting, namely that there was no section
2(d) violation since there is no right to collective bargaining under section
2(d) and any problems preventing agricultural workers from organizing
arise at the hands of their employers who are not government actors.65 The
majority in Dunmore found no breach in the denial of collective bargaining
rights, but did decide that the lack of unfair labour practice protection for
agricultural workers was a breach of section 2(d). Given the limited nature
of the breach, it was easy to conclude that a section 1 justification was
impossible for the government to meet; how could anyone deny the rights
of agricultural workers simply to organize?66
Dunmoreis a significant development in placing some responsibility

63 Ibid. at 379-80.
64

S.O. 1995, c. 1, Schedule A. This legislation brought to an end a brief period, under the NDP,

where agricultural workers had been granted statutorily recognized collective bargaining rights, but
not the right to strike. The appellants in Dunmore were not arguing for a right to strike.
65 Dunmore, supra note 5.
66 Ibid.
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on government for the actions of private actors. The evidence of the
extreme vulnerability of agricultural workers clearly had an impact on the

Court:
This is the first time this Court has been asked to review the total exclusion of an
occupational group from a statutory labour relations regime, where that group is not
employed by the government and has demonstrated no independent ability to organize ...
In this context, it must be asked whether, in order to make the freedom to organize
meaningful, s. 2(d) of the Charter imposes a positive obligation on the state to extend
protective legislation to unprotected groups. More broadly, it may be asked whether the
distinction between positive and negative state obligations ought to be nuanced in the
context of labour relations, in the sense that excluding agricultural workers from a
protective regime substantially contributes to the violation of protected freedoms. ... The
record shows that the ability to establish, join and maintain an agricultural employee
association is substantially impeded in the absence of such statutory protection and that this
impediment is substantially attributable to the exclusion itself, rather than to private action
exclusively. Moreover, the freedom to establish, join and maintain an agricultural employee
association lies at the core of s. 2(d) of67the Charter; the appellants' claim is ultimately
grounded in this non-statutory freedom.

Delisle was distinguished on the basis that the RCMP, unlike agricultural
68

workers, did have the ability to organize without legislative protection.

Thus, Dunmore, although qualified as exceptional, does mark an

important departure in giving some level of protection to union
organization rights in the private sector. Still, the limits of Dunmore must
be recognized. The remedy in Dunmore gives the Ontario legislature

eighteen months to enact legislation consistent with the Court's findings.69
It must be emphasized that the legislature is invited to extend unfair labour
practice protection, but to withhold collective bargaining rights. In other

words, it would be permissible to tell agricultural employers that while they
cannot retaliate 4gainst agricultural workers for their union activities, they
are still entitled to completely ignore any demands for collective
bargaining. The gains for agricultural workers arising from Dunmore are
not negligible, but they cannot be described as anything more than modest.

A substantial element of the PC 1003 model's concessions to unions, the
obligation of an employer to bargain with a union that can demonstrate
majority support in a bargaining unit, is still not incorporated.
Dunmore may be the thin edge of the wedge for future expansion

of section 2(d), but it is unclear how far that may be expected to go. On its
own terms, Dunmore only deals with issues on the margins of collective

67 Ibid. at paras. 2, 20, 67.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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bargaining legislation. Does Dunmore's repeated emphasis that collective
bargaining is not covered by freedom of association represent the final nail
in the coffin for such arguments? Or, does Dunmore's lack of articulation
of a clear rationale for excluding collective bargaining from freedom of
association signal the possibility of re-opening that issue in future? Only
time will tell.
There is, however, one further indication that the Court is quite
determined in its lack of sympathy for constitutional claims for collective
bargaining. Dunmore was argued on both section 2(d) and section 15
claims, but the Court held there was no need to answer the section 15
question in light of the success of the section 2(d) argument.70 "I am also
of the view that it is not necessary to consider the status of agricultural
workers under s. 15(1) of the Charter; assuming without deciding the
existence ofa s. 15(1) violation, such a violation would not alter the remedy
I propose."'"
It is hard to understand how the Court could reach this conclusion,
given its exclusion of collective bargaining from the scope of section 2(d).
A section 15 claim, had it been successful, would have given agricultural
workers a right to collective bargaining. The section 1 analysis in Dunmore
did not purport to determine the result if a right to collective bargaining
were encompassed in the prima facie breach. A section 15 right would not
be an independent right to collective bargaining, but a dependent one; that
is, it would be dependent on the legislative recognition of collective
bargaining rights of others. As a comparative analysis, the section 15 breach
would be to grant collective bargaining rights in a discriminatory fashion.
Justice Major, dissenting in Dunmore, avoided this result by concluding that
agricultural workers could not establish an analogous ground. Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd, in contrast, did find an analogous ground in Dunmore,73
but inexplicably did not pursue the implications for collective bargaining
rights. Ontario could avoid the section 15 issues by repealing the Labour
Relations Act and giving collective bargaining rights to no one, but that is
not remotely in the cards. In Delisle, arguing that police officers could
establish an analogous ground was a doomed argument, but agricultural
workers had at last a plausible claim in light of the treatment of analogous

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. at para.
2.
72 Ibid. One of the prerequisites for a section 15 breach is that there must be either an
enumerated or analogous ground of discrimination. See Law v.Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [19991 1 S.C.R. 493.
73 Dunmore, ibid.
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grounds in Corbiere.74 It is mysterious how the majority inDunmorethought

it had successfully ducked the issue of whether the denial of collective
bargaining rights of agricultural workers constitutes an analogous ground.
The majority somehow adopted a section 2(d) argument that excluded
collective bargaining rights while ignoring a section 15 argument that, if
successful, would have embraced collective bargaining rights.75
Ultimately, Dunmore leaves many questions unanswered. Even with
Dunmore, the legacy of twenty years of the Charteris that legislatures still
have a free reign in deciding what to do in relation to strikes and collective
bargaining. In the summer of 2001, the Nova Scotia legislature passed
legislation not only to take away the right to strike in the health care
sector, but also to allow unilateral imposition of a contract by the
government.76 This went far beyond the legislation in any of the cases in the
1987 trilogy, but ironically, the only section of the Nova Scotia statute
seriously vulnerable to successful constitutional challenge was the section
that purported to make the statute immune from constitutional challenge."
It was political pressure, not legal proceedings, that ultimately forced the
government to back down.78

If legal proceedings have any future potential given the roadblocks
of section 2(d), section 15 may provide more significant developments. Yet,
Dunmore seems to represent an extreme reluctance to engage section 15 in
the labour context.
III.

THE CHARTER AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Free expression issues in the labour context can involve claims
made by unions and their supporters, by union opponents, and by
employers. Most of the Supreme Court of Canada discussion, which will be

74Corbi~rev. Canada (Minister of Indian and NorthernAffairs), [19991 2 S.C.R.
203. Here the
Court adopted an expansive view of analogous grounds in concluding that members of an Aboriginal
band not ordinarily resident on the reserve could claim an analogous ground of discrimination.
75Avoiding the section 15 argument in Dunmore also leaves unclear the section 15
potential for
labour standards arguments. Even if there were constitutional protection for collective bargaining
rights for agricultural workers, it is not at all clear that even collective bargaining power would be very
effective in improving terms and conditions of employment. Access to guaranteed statutory minima
may be of much greater significance.
76 HealthcareServices Continuation(2001) Act, S.N.S 2001, c. 27.
Ibid., s. 13. This section was in clear disregard of the principle that statutes are always
reviewable in the courts for constitutional validity; Amax Potash Ltd. et al. v. Government of
Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576.
78 See supra note 44.
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assessed in this part, has involved claims by unions and their supporters.79
Claims by union opponents have arisen in the context of union security
issues, which will be dealt with in the next part.
There has been limited opportunity for the Supreme Court of
Canada to deal with employer's free expression issues. In Slaight
Communications Inc. v. Davidson,80 forced speech, along with forced

silence, were the employer's free expression issues. The case involved an
adjudication of an unjust dismissal claim, upheld by the adjudicator. Having
concluded that reinstatement was not viable, the adjudicator ordered, as a
remedy, that the employer provide a letter of reference written by the
adjudicator to Davidson's prospective employers and, in addition, he
ordered that the employer say nothing further. The Supreme Court of
Canada easily concluded that both compelled speech and compelled silence
are aprimafacie breach of freedom of expression, but the majority upheld
the order as a reasonable limit to give an unjustly dismissed employee a
realistic chance of obtaining new employment. Since this case was very fact
specific, it did not go very far in articulating general principles regarding
employer expression. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has had
several opportunities to comment on the general principles relevant to
union expression.
A.

Union Expression: Introduction

Union free expression issues are closely intertwined with the
exercise of freedom of association. Yet the free expression issues have been
easy to separate from freedom of association issues because they have
arisen in contexts where the unions were involved in lawful strikes or
lockouts. Where there was no issue as to the legality of the strike or lockout
-because it was clear that the exertion of some economic pressure was
lawful-the free expression issues have focussed on the extent of the
permissible economic pressure.
As discussed in the previous part, the Supreme Court of Canada has
created significant hurdles to establishing a prima facie breach of section
2(d). In contrast, making out a prima facie infringement of section 2(b),

freedom of expression, has been relatively easy; the cases almost always

For ease of reference, these will be referred to as "union" claims.
80 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
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turn on a section 1 analysis."1 The starting premise has been to recognize
the importance of free expression for workers, as explained by Justice Cory
in United Food and CommercialWorkers, Local 1518 v. KMart CanadaLtd:
It follows that workers, particularly those who are vulnerable, must be able to speak freely
on matters that relate to their working conditions. For employees, freedom of expression
becomes not only an important but an essential component of labour relations. It is through
free expression that vulnerable workers are able to enlist the support of the public in their
quest for better conditions of work. Thus their expression can often function as a means of
achieving their goals. 82

Until recently, however, union expression claims have failed because of the
successful invocation of section 1 justifications.
Two main issues in the union expression cases have been the
analysis of the "signal effect" of labour picketing and the treatment of

"secondary sites" to a labour conflict.
B.

The "SignalEffect"

The leading authority on section 2(b), Quebec (A.G.) v. Irwin Toy
Limited et al.,83 is not a labour case; however, a labour case, namely, Retail,
Wholesale andDepartmentStore Union, Local 580 v. DolphinDeliveryLtd.,84
set the stage for Irwin Toy. The fact that Dolphin Delivery was a freedom

of expression case has been overshadowed because it was the first major
Charterapplication decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. Moreover,
the ultimate conclusion that the Charterdid not apply to the common law
in the absence of a government actor meant that the Court's comments on
freedom of expression rights were technically obiter.

The freedom of expression issue in Dolphin Delivery was whether
or not peaceful labour picketing is expressive behaviour. 85 The Court, with
the exception of Justice Beetz, readily concluded that peaceful labour
picketing falls within the scope of free expression, as activity that conveys
meaning. Justice Beetz concluded that peaceful labour picketing fell

outside the scope of section 2(b) for the reasons given by the majority of

81 The text of section 1 is: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
82 [199912 S.C.R. 1083 at 1101-1102 [KMart].
83 [19891 1 S.C.R. 927 [Irwin Toy].
84 [19861 2 S.C.R. 573 [Dolphin Delivery].
85 The specific context for that issue will be dealt with in more detail below.
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the Court of Appeal.86 Specifically, Justice Beetz contended that picketing
is a signal to action- to not cross the picket line-rather than discourse or
dialogue.87 In so holding, Justice Beetz could at least claim consistency; in
a pre-Charter division of powers case, Justice Beetz, speaking for the
majority in Canada (A.G.) et al. v. Dupond et al.,88 went well beyond

rejecting the implied bill of rights theory in upholding a Montreal bylaw
prohibiting demonstrations: "Demonstrations are not a form of speech but
of collective action. They are of the nature of a display of force rather than
of that of an appeal to reason; their inarticulateness prevents them from
becoming part of language and from reaching the level of discourse." 89
Although the rest of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dolphin
9
Delivery ° did not accept this argument as reason enough to preclude a
section 2(b) claim from its inception, the "signal to action" notion has
nonetheless since remained important in the section 1analysis in permitting
significant restrictions on labour picketing. The authority that the Supreme
Court of Canada repeatedly invoked in identifying the signal effect of
labour picketing is someone with considerable labour expertise, Paul
Weiler, 9' who was, among other things, former Chair of the British
Columbia Labour Relations Board.
In British Columbia Government Employees' Union v. British
Columbia (A.G.), 92 the "signal to action" assumption was a substantial

explanation of why enjoining the picketing of courthouses by court workers
lawfully on strike was so easily upheld, so as to avoid any impeding of
access to courts.93 It never seemed to occur to the Supreme Court of
Canada that people, especially those with no legal obligation or
responsibility to appear in court, might rationally choose not to exercise
their right of access to courts.94

86 Supra 84 at 604.
87

]bid. at 587.
88 [19781 2 S.C.R. 770 [Dupond].
89 Ibid. at 797.
90 By the time of Dolphin Delivery, Justice Beetz was the only member of the Dupond majority
still sitting on the Supreme Court of Canada.
91 See generally, Paul C. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell
1980).
92 [19881 2 S.C.R. 214 [BCGEU].
93 For Justice McIntyre, concurring,the pre-eminence of not impeding access to courts precluded
even a prima facie breach of section 2(b).
94
See A. Wayne MacKay & Dianne Pothier, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The
1988-89
Term" (1990) 1 Supreme Court L. R. (2nd) 81 at 131-135.
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In both KMart andAllsco BuildingProductsLtd. v. United Foodand
CommercialWorkers InternationalUnion, Local 1288P," the "signal effect"
of conventional picketing was critical to the conclusion that conventional
picketing is subject to more stringent limitations than consumer leafleting.
Justice Cory, speaking for the Court in KMart, described conventional
labour picketing in a way very similar to Justice Beetz's description of
demonstrations in Dupond:
Conventional picketing is characterized by picket lines which have a "signal effect". It is
often understood as attracting an automatic reflex response from workers, suppliers and
consumers. Its existence impedes access to picketed sites. This impediment to movement
may discourage some people from making rational choices based on persuasive discourse.
... The decision for people, whether employees, suppliers or consumers, not to cross the
picket line may be based on its coercive effect rather than the persuasive force of the
picketers."

I have little difficulty with the general descriptive accuracy of the
"signal effect"; conventional picket lines are designed to induce people not
to cross, and are largely effective in that aim. What I fail to understand is
why the "signal effect" in any way detracts from picketing being expression
worthy of protection, or makes respect of a picket line irrational.
Much of human expression is an attempt to persuade others to act
in a particular way, and signals are very common speech. Consider
commercial signs, which the Supreme Court of Canada went to great
lengths to protect in Quebec A.G. v. ChaussureBrown's Inc., Ford, et al.97
If a store has a sign saying "Brown Shoes" or "Chaussure Brown's Shoes"
or "Chaussure Brown's," the sign, in whichever language (the issue in this
case), is designed to have a signal effect. If you are interested in buying or
looking at shoes, you are invited to enter the store. If you have no interest
in shoes that day, you are expected to pass by. Such a signal is obviously less
contentious than that of a typical picket line; my point is simply that the fact
of its being a signal to action is itself innocuous. What matters is what kind
of action, and how it is being signalled.
If the picketers are so numerous and concentrated that it is
physically impossible to cross the line, or if there is some genuine reason to
believe that picketers will use their signs to physically harm people if they
try to cross, such a picket line is indeed properly described as coercive. But
how can genuinely peaceful picketing be properly described as coercive if

[1999] 2 S.C.R. 1136 [hereinafterAlsco].
96

KMart, supra note 82 at 1110, 1112.
97 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [ChaussureBrown's].
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the only consequence of crossing is the wrath of the picketers? Picketing in
conjunction with a lawful strike or lockout is, by definition, in connection
with a lawful dispute. Asking people to take sides in that dispute cannot be
anything other than an exercise of free expression worthy of strong
protection. That it may be unpleasant or tense simply underscores the point
that free expression encompasses the right to profoundly disagree.
Furthermore, even if the target of the message declines to cross, simply to
avoid an argument, rather than as an expression of genuine support, that
does not render the initial message coercive. Choosing to avoid a
confrontation is itself an exercise of free expression.
The assumption that the reflexive nature of observing a picket line
makes it irrational is even more troubling. The automatic response does not
indicate an automaton state; instead, it means that the issue has been
previously thought through. Refusal to cross a picket line is a political and
ideological statement of union solidarity; the fact that others may not share
the same ideology does not make it irrational. The equation of solidarity to
irrationality attacks the core values of both freedom of expression and
freedom of association,98 despite the fact, as noted in the previous part, that
the Court so readily accepted the principle that freedom of association
includes the collective exercise of freedom of expression.
The fact that picket lines do not often give rise to long
conversations with those who might contemplate crossing should not be a
relevant factor. What does brevity of expression have to do with the degree
of constitutional protection? Free expression does not mean that people
start with a blank slate with every new exchange of views. Even very brief
encounters can carry a significant amount of meaning. Whether a picket
line prompts a tooted horn in support or a yelled invective from a passing
car, there is a two-way conveyance of meaning that all concerned
understand from a much larger context than the few seconds of contact.
In KMart and Alisco, the Supreme Court of Canada gave
constitutional protection to consumer leafleting at "secondary sites"99 on
the assumption that consumer leafleting is not an invocation of the "signal
effect":
Consumer leafleting is very different from a picket line. It seeks to persuade members of
the public to take a certain course of action. It does so through informed and rational
discourse which is the very essence of freedom of expression. Leafleting does not trigger the
"signal" effect inherent in picket lines and it certainly does not have the same coercive

98 Michael MacNeil, "Labour Picketing and Consumer Boycotts: Judicial Ideology in KMart and
Allsco" (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 79 at 91-92.
99 The location issue will be dealt with in Part
IlI.C.

Labour Law and the Charter

2002]

component. It does not in any significant manner impede access to or egress from premises.
... It is true that both leafleting and secondary picketing seek to achieve the same objective,
that is to bring economic pressure on the employer. However, it is the means utilized to
achieve that pressure which distinguishes these actions. The public has a right to know the
factual background and nature of a labour dispute."

I fail to understand how a consumer leaflet is any less of an attempt
to invoke a "signal effect" than a conventional picket line. Both are used to
convey the message not to deal with the adjacent premises. The fact that
more words are typically on a leaflet than on a sign is hardly a compelling
case to tip the scales of rational discourse. Leafleters have no responsibility
to, and make no effort to, give both sides of the story. I am sure neither
KMart nor Alisco would have agreed the leaflets gave the reader sufficient
information on which to make an informed choice; at the very least they
would have put a different spin on the factual information in the leaflet.
Freedom of expression does not require one side in a dispute to give a
balanced account to the public; it is up to each side to decide what message
to convey, and with how much detail. The number of words should not have
constitutional significance. I have never heard it suggested that an election
sign is undeserving of constitutional protection because there is not enough
on the sign to generate rational discourse.
The real significance of the number of words is not rationality, but
visibility. Leafleting is trying to invoke the "signal effect" just as much as
the conventional picket line, but it is simply much less effective in doing so
because the signal is less readily conveyed. Picket signs can be seen from a
distance whereas delivering the signal via leafleting requires close
proximity. In deciding that consumer leafleting is protected expression in
a context where a conventional picket line would not be, the Court's
underlying reason for protecting consumer leafleting turns out to be its
relative ineffectiveness! Although KMart andAlisco expanded the scope of
protected union speech in protecting consumer leafleting at secondary sites,
the change is a marginal one.
In its decision in Pepsi, the Supreme Court of Canada, speaking
through Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel, was itself critical of the
"signal effect" analysis. In Pepsi, the Court observed that the effect of the
signal depends on the circumstances' 0 ' and what the signal is attempting to
accomplish,' °2 and remarked that there should not be special rules for

100 KMart, supra note 2 at 1113-1115.
101

Pepsi, supra note 5.
102 Ibid.
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signalling, or for union speech.' °3 At one point the Court seemed to be
ready to abandon the "signal effect" analysis altogether:
It is difficult to see how a signal can be other than expressive; by definition, a signal is meant
to convey information to others. Indeed, the underlying concern of KMart is that the signal
will express too much, that it will be too effective. It seems better to us to admit that
signalling is expression, the limitations of which must be justified."

However, the Court ended its discussion of signalling on a more
equivocal note:
We should therefore be mindful not to extend the application of the signal effect to all
forms of union expression. ... Given the diverse range of activities captured by the term
"picketing," it is apparent that the signal effect operates to a greater degree in some
situations than in others. We conclude that signalling concerns may provide a justification
for proscribing secondary picketing in particular cases, but certainly not as a general rule.5 ,

The "signal effect" discussion was somewhat peripheral in Pepsi,
which was more focused on the question of location, the subject of the next
subsection. As will be discussed below, while Pepsi clarified some matters,
it also left many questions unanswered. How much significance is left to the
"signal effect" will depend on where it fits into the economic torts referred
to below, something not genuinely explored in Pepsi.
C.

"Secondary Sites"

Unless the strikers are court workers, in which case BCGEU makes
it clear that all bets are off, it has long been accepted that it is lawful to
engage in peaceful picketing or leafleting on public property adjacent to the
struck or locked-out premises, assuming that access to entrances is not
blocked. The battleground over the limitation on picketing or leafleting has
been whether it is lawful at "secondary sites."
In Dolphin Delivery, the employees represented by the appellant
union had been locked out by their employer, Purolator. Dolphin had
previously done business with Purolator, but Dolphin was now doing
business with Supercourier, which the union considered to be a front for
Purolator. The evidence before the Court did not disclose the exact nature
of the relationship between Supercourier and Purolator. When the union
threatened to stage a picket in front of Dolphin's premises, Dolphin

103 Ibid. at para. 97.
104 Ibid. at para. 96.
105 Ibid. at para. 100.

2002]

Labour Law and the Charter

obtained an interlocutory injunction. Although the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded that the Charterdid not actually apply in the absence of
a government actor, 10 6 Justice McIntyre .did indicate that the injunction
would, in any event, be consistent with section 1.
This case involves secondary picketing-picketing of a third party not concerned in the
dispute which underlies the picketing. The basis of our system of collective bargaining is the
proposition that the parties themselves should, wherever possible, work out their own
agreement.... While picketing is, no doubt, a legitimate weapon to be employed in a labour
dispute by the employees against their employer, it should not be permitted to harm others.
... It is my opinion then that a limitation on secondary picketing against a third party, that
is, a non-ally, would be a reasonable limit in the facts of this case.""

What is extraordinary is that this conclusion was reached without
any serious analysis of the distinction between primary and secondary
picketing, without any discussion of what it takes to constitute an "ally,"
and without any knowledge of the effect of Dolphin's dealings with
Supercourier on the dispute between Purolator and the union to
demonstrate that Dolphin was indeed "uninvolved." Moreover, the Court
accepted the application of the tort of inducing breach of contract, without
any analysis of the tort. I cannot resist commenting that it is the Supreme
Court of Canada that is circumventing rational discourse. When unions
target premises for picketing other than those of the struck employer, it is
presumably on the assumption that there is some connection with the
labour dispute, or it would be a complete waste of time and effort.' The
legal analysis should focus on whether or not the extent of the connection
is sufficient to warrant the exercise of economic pressure, and if so, how.
In KMart, the secondary analysis was quite surreal. Although the
free expression claim was sustained on the basis of it being consumer
leafleting, the "secondary" nature of the leafleting was accepted as fact.
Throughout the judgement reference was made to "neutral sites" and
"neutral third parties." Yet the labour dispute and the leafleting all
involved KMart. The union was certified at two locations of KMart and was
leafleting other locations. Although arguments could be made about not
extending the dispute beyond the particular bargaining unit, it strains
credulity to claim that this has anything to do with neutrality when a single

106 The case arose before Purolator was bought by Canada Post.
107 Dolphin Delivery, supra note 84 at 590-92.
108 This point is acknowledged in Pepsi, supra note 5 at para. 104.
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company is involved.' °9 In Alisco, the targeted premises were at least
independent companies, but they were retailers or users of Allsco products.
Whether or not they wanted to be involved in Alisco's labour dispute, their
connection to Allsco meant that they were, at least in some sense,

implicated.
It was not until Pepsi that the Supreme Court of Canada took a
hard look at the primary/secondary distinction. There had been picketing
at several non-Pepsi locations, notably including distributors of Pepsi
products; an injunction against that picketing was ultimately ruled invalid.
The issue was framed as whether secondary picketing is illegal per se at
common law, as held by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Hersees of
Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein."0 There was no legislation at issue; thus, the
case was analyzed in accordance with Chartervalues, rather than Charter
rights. According to Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto,"' Charter

values are to be used to develop the common law incrementally. The Court
approached the issue from the following perspective:
Therefore, third parties are to be protected from undue suffering, not insulated entirely
from the repercussions of labour conflict ... .Even primary picketing frequently imposes
costs, often substantial, on third parties to the dispute, through stoppages in supplies or the
loss of the primary employer as a customer ...
[y]et this impact on third parties and the
public has never rendered primary picketing illegal per se at common law to protect the
interests of third parties. So we are left with this: innocent third parties should be shielded
from "undue" harm. This brings us to the question that lies at the heart of this appeal. How
do we judge when the detriment suffered by a third party to a labour dispute is "undue",
warranting the intervention of the common law? At this stage, it suffices to note that the
protection of innocent third parties from the economic fallout of labour disputes, while a
compelling consideration, is not absolute. Some economic harm to third parties is
anticipated by our labour relations system as a necessary cost of resolving industrial

109 Over fifty years ago, in Williams v.Aristocratic Restaurants Ltd (1947), [1951] S.C.R.
762, the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized other locations of the same employer as legitimate targets for
picketing, seemingly as an instance of primary picketing. See Pepsi, ibid., at 370. See also Patrick
Macklem, "Secondary Picketing, Consumer Boycotts and the Charter" (2000) 8 C.L.E.L.J. 1.
[1963] 2 O.R. 81 (C.A.) [Hersees].
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1169. Justice Cory explained:
Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making those incremental
changes which were necessary in order to make the law comply with current societal values.
The Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape our
democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts to
make such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have it comply
with the values enunciated in the Charter.
When determining how the Charterapplies to the common law, it is important to distinguish
between those cases in which the constitutionality of government action is challenged, and
those in which there is no government action involved. It is important not to import into
private litigation the analysis which applies in cases involving government action.
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The Court reviewed three possible approaches: the illegal per se
doctrine, where all secondary picketing is unlawful, and primary picketing
is strictly defined; the modified illegal per se doctrine, where all secondary
picketing is unlawful, but primary picketing is more broadly defined to
include allies and other associated entities; and the wrongful conduct
model, where picketing is lawful unless it amounts to criminal or tortious
activity.
The Court rejected both the strict and the modified illegal per se
doctrines on the basis that they are based on a distinction that is ultimately
arbitrary, and are too inflexible-they are unresponsive to the wide variety
of circumstances of secondary picketing. This is the typical fate of blanket
rules under the Charter."' It is difficult to meet the minimal impairment
test where there is no account of nuance, and/or where the balance is onesided against the constitutionally protected right.
The Court instead embraced the wrongful conduct model on the
basis that it is responsive to particular circumstances:
Torts such as trespass, intimidation, nuisance and inducing breach of contract, will protect
property interests and ensure free access to private premises. Rights arising out of contracts
or business relationships will also receive basic protection. Torts,
themselves the creatures
4
of common law, may grow and be adapted to current needs.1

Still, the Court reached the conclusion that the economic torts are
sufficiently protective of free expression, incorporating an appropriate
balance, with virtually no analysis of those torts. Even a limited survey
would have revealed that the economic torts are a conceptual minefield." 5
The Court in Pepsi conceded that "a great deal""' 6 of picketing will be
caught by the various torts, and also indicated that where legislatures
choose to regulate picketing, considerable deference would be accorded to
legislative line drawing. 17

112 Pepsi,supra note 5 at paras. 44-45 [emphasis in original].
113 See e.g. ChaussureBrown's, supra note 97.
114 Pepsi,supra note 5 at para.
73.
115 Harry Arthurs, "Comments-Labour Law-Secondary Picketing-Per Se
Illegality-Public
Policy" (1963) 41 Can. Bar Rev. 573. Arthurs notes at 579 that the purported application of the tort
of inducing breach of contract in Hersees was fundamentally flawed in allowing the would-be contract
breaker to bring the action.
116 Pepsi, supra note 5 at para. 103.
117 Ibid.
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While the Supreme Court of Canada clearly rejected the illegal per
se doctrine that had been articulated almost forty years earlier by the
Ontario Court of Appeal, the substituted wrongful conduct model is one of
very uncertain application. Thus, it is quite unclear how much of a change
in the law is really involved. Moreover, the Court's emphasis that location
is not the sole determining factor in the legality of picketing' may raise the
possibility that primary picketing might be more vulnerable to future
challenge than it historically has been.
What is ultimately missing in Pepsi is a clear articulation of
principles to determine how far a labour dispute can be legitimately
extended through the exercise of workers' freedom of expression.
IV.

THE CHARTER AND UNION SECURITY

North America is unique in having a collective bargaining system
based on majority rule, with a union being the exclusive bargaining agent
for all the employees in the unit, whether or not they are members of the
union. This raises potential issues related to the infringement of dissident
employees' rights.' 9
Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union

20

involved a

claim by an employee of a community college who was, in accordance with
the collective agreement, covered by a Rand formula. He was not required
to belong to the union, but he was required to pay the equivalent of union
dues. The theory of the Rand formula in a system based on an exclusive
bargaining agent is that non-members of the union who gain the benefits
negotiated in a collective agreement should not be entitled to be "free
riders." Lavigne did not challenge that basic premise, and he was prepared
to accept his obligation to pay to cover the union's collective bargaining
expenses. However, he objected that "his" money was being used for what
he considered to be non-collective bargaining expenses. He won at trial,
and as a remedy, Justice White ordered an ad hoc arbitration process to
determine what constituted non-collective bargaining expenses from which
non-members could exempt themselves. The practical implications of this
remedy are noteworthy. Although the basis for the Charterapplying to the
issues in this case was the fact that the employer, as a party to the collective
agreement, was a government actor, the remedy only implicated the union,

118 Ibid. at para. 75.
119 David Beatty, Putting the Charterto Work :Designinga Constitutional Labour Code (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987).
120 [19911 2 S.C.R. 211 [Lavigne].
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not itself a government actor. Furthermore, the process for determining
what constituted non-collective bargaining expenditures would likely have
been more costly than the amount of the disputed expenditures. These
discordances probably contributed to the Supreme Court of Canada's
reversal of the trial decision.
The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in rejecting
Lavigne's claims, based on both freedom of expression and freedom of
association. However, there were several different routes employed by the
various judges in reaching this decision. The best way to understand
Lavigne is probably not by dissecting the various judgments, but rather by
appreciating the significance of Justice Wilson's candid remarks:
Beginning with the Alberta Reference and culminating most recently in the decision in
P.IP.S., supra, this Court has repeatedly stated that s. 2(d) does not protect the objects of
an association. Unions have accordingly been denied constitutional protection for activities
which are central, indeed fundamental, to their effective functioning within our system of
collective bargaining. Mr. Lavigne submits, however, that while the objects of an association
are irrelevant to the claims of collectivities of working people, they may legitimately be
taken into account when assessing the claim of an individual who objects to being associated
with the objects of such a collectivity. I do not believe it is open to the Court to engage in
one-sided justice of this kind. Since s. 2(d) protects both individuals and collectivities, if the
objects of an association cannot be invoked to advance the constitutional claims 2of- unions,
then neither, it seems to me, can they be invoked in order to undermine them.1

The Rand formula, even the expenditure of monies for non-collective
bargaining purposes, is too close to the core of our current system of
collective bargaining for the Supreme Court of Canada to be willing to
upset the apple cart.
In contrast, compulsory union membership does not produce as
clear deference. The recent decision in Advance Cutting"' involved a very
complex factual and legislative context in the Quebec construction industry
in which construction workers were required to belong to one of five
unions. As in Lavigne, there were multiple judgments with divergent
reasoning. But unlike in Lavigne, the Court inAdvance Cuttingwas sharply
split on the outcome. The legislative provisions survived constitutional
attack, but just barely, on a five-to-four split. This may mean that
compulsory union membership may be vulnerable in the future. If so, I
think the explanation would be that, while the Rand formula is considered
central to our current scheme of collective bargaining, compulsory union
membership is considered peripheral, partly owing to the fact that it is not
common outside the construction industry. In the judges' eyes, that makes
121 Ibid. at 264.
122 Advance Cutting, supra note 5.
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it more open to challenge.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the first seventeen years of the Charter and labour law in the
Supreme Court of Canada, there was a lot of ink spilled simply to stand
still. It was only in 1999, with the decisions in KMart andAlisco, that Charter
interpretation first discernibly changed the law, by giving constitutional
protection to consumer leafleting. Although a modest change, this seemed
to signify that the earlier judicial deference to legislative policy choices in
labour law has its limits. In the past year, that has been confirmed,
especially in Dunmore. Yet even Dunmore can only be described as
tinkering on the margins. Moreover, Dunmore involved a reinforcement of
the dominant model, not a challenge to it. In Pepsi,where the specific issue
was about the common law rather than legislation, the dominant legislative
model was still in the Court's mind: "In summary, a wrongful action
approach to picketing allows for a proper balance between traditional
common law rights and Charter values, and falls in line with the core
in place in this country in
principles of the collective bargaining system12put
3
the years following the Second World War."
While recent cases indicate greater willingness on the part ofjudges
to intervene on Charterissues in labour law, it is still well within the PC
1003 model. Despite Robertson's and Fulford's predictions, the Charterhas
not been the source of either revolution or counter-revolution in labour
law. That is not likely to change. Politics still explains much more about
labour law than constitutional law does.

123

Pepsi, supra note 5 at para. 74.

